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*L.Q.R. 270 INTRODUCTION
OVERREACHING is a term most commonly defined as the process of transferring equitable interests
under a trust from a specific piece of land to the capital money received from the purchaser (including
a lessee or mortgagee) of a legal estate in that land. However, the transfer of equitable interests from
specific property to capital money is a process that is familiar in trusts of personalty1 ; this process is
also “overreaching”, although rarely called such. Again, the process by which the ownership of a legal
estate in land is transformed into a claim against the purchase money in a mortgagee's hands is
familiar from the law of mortgages. It occurs whenever a mortgagee exercises its power of sale; this is
also a form of overreaching. Therefore, to be adequate to the task, an account of overreaching must
be able to incorporate the possibility of the overreaching of legal interests. Further, any account of
overreaching that aspires to the status of a principled account of the process must also be able to
include within its purview both trusts of land and trusts of personalty. Any account that treats the
process, as opposed to the term, as one that is limited to the law of real property undermines the
policy of harmonising the law of real and personal property effected by the 1925 property legislation.
Happily, an account of overreaching was written in 1990 that gave us an approach that was
principled, and flexible enough to provide the starting point of all analysis for the foreseeable future.
In 1990 Charles Harpum published a truly seminal article, “Overreaching, Trustees' Powers and the
Reform of the 1925 Legislation”,2 which clarified the nature of the process of overreaching. Peter
Gibson L.J., in State Bank of India v. Sood, 3 largely adopted the analysis:
“As is explained by Charles Harpum in his illuminating article … overreaching is the process whereby
existing interests are subordinated to a later interest or estate created pursuant to a trust or power. Mr
Harpum arrived at that statement of the true nature of overreaching by a consideration of the effect of
the exercise of powers of disposition in a settlement … He argued cogently that a transaction made
by a person within the dispositive powers conferred upon him *L.Q.R. 271 will overreach equitable
interests in the property the subject of the disposition, but ultra vires dispositions will not.”4
The latest edition of the leading textbook on land law, Megarry and Wade, Law of Real Property, has
adopted this analysis.5 The enactment of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996
(subsequently abbreviated as TLATA) sounded the death knell for the only alternative analysis of
overreaching that had any currency, an explanation of overreaching that, in the case of the trust for
sale, relied on the doctrine of conversion. Anybody persisting with such an analysis after 1996 would
be forced to conclude that the operation of overreaching upon a conveyance, or transfer, of land had
been significantly reduced by the Act.6 The present authors have accepted elsewhere the essential
correctness of Harpum's analysis.7 However, there are two areas in which a return to “Overreaching,
Trustees' Powers and the Reform of the 1925 Legislation” remains necessary. That article left some
questions less than fully considered, and it also reached some conclusions that the authors feel
unable to endorse. These issues are considered here, in the hope that a full analytical framework will
be provided for any further study of overreaching. Indeed, this article is intended to be a prelude to an
examination of overreaching of equitable interests in land after TLATA and more recent legislation.8
We take it as established by Harpum that under the statutory scheme created by the Law of Property
Act 1925 (subsequently abbreviated as LPA) the existence of a trust for sale of land was meant to be
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apparent on the face of the title to land.9 Therefore, the extent of the powers of the trustees for sale
would normally be apparent to a purchaser.10 The common law provided that overreaching would
occur whenever a trustee, or some other person with a power to dispose of property, made a
disposition within their powers.11 This ability to overreach was not bestowed by the 1925 *L.Q.R. 272
legislation, and was not an ability unique to trustees.12 The corollary of overreaching being an intra
vires use of a limited owner's powers was that an ultra vires disposition would not overreach.13
Although trustees for sale were not unique in being able to overreach, their status as trustees had
certain implications for the way in which overreaching operated within the context of a trust for sale.
Trustees for sale held the legal estate in the land, and could rely upon their legal title to effect the
conveyance of a legal interest to a purchaser.14 Therefore, when discussing the “powers” of trustees
for sale we are in fact discussing their authority to act, and it is unauthorised dispositions that would
not overreach. Given that the trustees' capacity to pass a legal interest was conferred by their legal
title, a legal estate could pass, regardless of whether the disposition was unauthorised or ultra vires.
There is no room within this analysis for the operation of the doctrine of conversion,15 nor do we need
to look to section 2 of the LPA for the origins of the trustees' ability to overreach.16 Therefore, the
primary service performed by section 2 for purchasers must be to limit the application of the doctrine
of notice.17 The section was not meant to, nor did it, allow an ultra vires disposition by trustees for sale
to overreach, and a disposition by trustees for sale outside their powers did not have an overreaching
effect.18 Thus, our starting point in analysing overreaching is the essential correctness of Harpum's
reasoning in his article, which we have attempted to summarise above.
We rely heavily on Harpum's analysis, but the other side of the coin is that those areas in which we
feel it is deficient, or even wrong, are of particular importance. The role assigned to section 2 of the
LPA was never very clearly demarcated, perhaps the natural result of an analysis that aimed to
demonstrate that section 2 could not provide the foundation of overreaching, but was ancillary to the
general law. We feel that this neglect of the true role of section 2 of the LPA led Harpum into error
when he suggested that Hodgson v. Marks 19 was wrongly decided.20 Although the peculiar problems
of a bare trustee with no powers of disposition cannot arise after the passage of TLATA,21 we feel that
the decision in Hodgson v. Marks was clearly right, and that the authority of the case is untouched
*L.Q.R. 273 by Harpum's analysis. Harpum also assigned what we consider to be an entirely
inappropriate function to section 18 of the Land Registration Act 1925 (subsequently abbreviated as
LRA), when he argued that it granted powers of disposition to trustees for sale of land. It was this
error that led him to conclude that City of London Building Society v. Flegg 22 was decided per
incuriam. 23 Some of their Lordships' observations in Flegg must now be considered as misconceived,
deriving as they do from the rejected analysis of overreaching, as a process which relied upon the
doctrine of conversion.24 However, their Lordships also gave emphasis to the crucial role of the
powers of disposition of trustees for sale in overreaching, and this aspect of the decision is supported
by Harpum's analysis. Although we have dealt elsewhere with the suggestion that trustees for sale of
registered land had different powers of disposition from trustees for sale of unregistered land prior to
1996,25 the continued vitality of what we consider an error forces us to return to this issue.
This article attempts both to extend and develop the analysis of overreaching. Overreaching by
mortgagees, by trustees of land, and by tenants for life is each considered. As each of these
overreachers possesses different attributes, the comparison is instructive. The analyses confirm the
importance of clarity as to the nature of the powers bestowed upon owners of property interests for a
proper understanding of the effect of a disposition by such owners. With the benefit of this insight we
return to the problem identified above, of the true nature of the powers granted by section 18 of the
LRA.26 This preliminary analysis prepares the way for a consideration of the role of section 2 of the
LPA in the operation of overreaching. Although not all the difficulties presented by overreaching are
dealt with, in particular the impact of recent legislation27 is only touched upon, the articulation of the
principles of overreaching provides the necessary first stage of any future analysis in this area.
THE NATURE OF POWERS
It is necessary to note an ambiguity present in the word “power”. “Power” can mean ability to act; thus
one has the power to raise one's arm. “Power” can mean authority to act; thus one can empower an
agent to act on one's behalf. It follows that, if trustees attempt to exceed their powers, their action will
either be ineffective (as they lacked the ability), or effective but *L.Q.R. 274 wrong (as the act was
unauthorised).28 However, the situation is more complex than this. The grant of a power may give
both ability and authority to act. Therefore, there is more than one possible effect upon a third party of
an ultra vires disposition. If the grant of a power is the grant of authority, there may be more than one
possible outcome.29 However, if the grant of a power is the grant of an ability, then an ultra vires
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transaction will simply be of no effect.30
A power that combines ability and authority--the mortgagee's power of sale
We have already differentiated between two distinct meanings of the word “power”. However the word
can carry intermediate meanings denoting elements of both ability and authority. An example of a
mixed power is the mortgagee's power of sale after 1926.
The LPA introduced the legal charge to land law, and the old form of mortgage by conveyance of the
legal estate with a provision for re-conveyance was specifically abolished.31 Prior to this legislation a
mortgagee held a legal estate, and had an express power of sale contained in the deed of mortgage,
or a statutory power of sale conferred prior to 1926 by section 19 of the Conveyancing and Law of
Property Act 1881.32 A power of sale was not needed in order to allow a mortgagee to transfer its
legal estate; it was able to do this by right of its legal estate. Therefore, a mortgagee with no legal
estate, i.e. an equitable mortgagee, could not convey a legal estate, and the power of sale granted by
section 19 was irrelevant to the issue. In Re Hodson and Howe's Contract 33 Cotton L.J. refused to
accept that section 19 was in any way concerned with the conveyance of legal estates: “Now what is
a power of sale in a mortgage? *L.Q.R. 275 It is an equitable authority, which enables the mortgagee
to sell so as to give the purchaser the estate discharged from the equity of redemption. What is there
in the Act to enable a mere equitable mortgagee to convey the legal estate?”34 The power of a legal
mortgagee to convey a legal estate was rooted in its own legal estate and the powers of disposition
conferred by that estate; to cite Cotton L.J. in the later case of Re Harwood : “a power of sale in a
mortgage is nothing but an authority to defeat the equity of redemption, and when the mortgagee sells
he transfers the legal estate not by means of a power but by virtue of his legal ownership”.35
The denial of the legal estate to a legal chargee carries implications for the law. Section 101 of the
LPA grants the holder of a legal charge a power of sale, which when exercised will pass the legal fee
simple of the mortgagor.36 As a mortgagee holding a legal charge never holds the fee simple in the
land, the power of sale granted by section 101 must grant the ability to convey that estate to the
mortgagor. The same analysis applies to a mortgage by demise in respect of the reversion vested in
the mortgagor. This change means that the mortgagee's power of sale is the grant of one of the few
remaining examples after 1926 of the ability to transfer a legal estate that is not vested in the
transferee.37
The nature of a mortgagee's power of sale means that some dispositions, if attempted by a
mortgagee, will be invalid in law. The power granted is one of sale; therefore, the grant of a legal
charge of the fee simple,38 or the grant of an option over the fee simple,39 by a mortgagee in purported
exercise of its power of sale would be void. Similarly, a purported sale by a mortgagee to itself is void
at law,40 as is a conveyance to a purchaser when the power of sale has not arisen.41 Since the
consequences of a legally invalid, or void, conveyance would be so serious for purchasers from
mortgagees, we can expect that the existence and extent of the power should be capable of easy and
sure ascertainment by a purchaser, as this ensures the validity in law of an exercise of the power. Of
course, once the existence of a power of sale, and the validity in law of its exercise, have been
demonstrated, there remains the possibility that a mortgagee may act wrongly, leading to some
infirmity in a conveyance to a purchaser. *L.Q.R. 276 However, such an infirmity will operate only in
equity. Structurally the position of the mortgagee after 1925 is analogous to the position of the holder
of a legal power of appointment prior to 1926. The distinction between factors that can operate to
invalidate a conveyance at law and factors that can operate only in equity seems to underlie the
legislative distinction between the power of sale arising and the power of sale being exercisable.42 A
purported exercise of a power that has not arisen is void at law, but an improper exercise of an
existing power before it becomes properly exercisable is merely void in equity. Before the power
arises the mortgagee lacks the ability to sell the fee simple. Once the power has arisen, but before a
case for its exercise arises, the mortgagee lacks the authority to sell.43
The nature of the powers conferred on trustees of land prior to 1996
We are concerned here with the dispositive powers of trustees, their powers to sell, lease, mortgage
or otherwise dispose of land held on trust.44 Such powers may be used in the course of the
administration of a trust, when trustees sell land in order to acquire some other investment.45 Such
powers may be used to account to those entitled to the trust property in equity, by transfer of land
held on trust to a beneficiary, or by a disposition to a third party and a subsequent payment to a
beneficiary.46 Although for negotiable property, such as money, anyone is able to pass the legal title
to the property (irrespective of the title of the person transferring the money), the general rule is that a
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transfer by any persons without a good title to the property will be nugatory.47 We do not mean any
implication that dispositive powers are those involved in the distribution of the trust property to the
beneficiaries in contradistinction to administrative powers.48 By “dispositive powers” we do not mean
to imply any contrast with *L.Q.R. 277 dispositive duties.49 For present purposes, a duty to dispose of
the trust property in a certain way is merely a power so to dispose of the property coupled with a
personal obligation on the trustee to exercise that power, and the nature of the power is unaffected by
the existence of the obligation.
Cases dealing with a mortgagee's power of sale prior to 1926 are directly analogous to the law
dealing with trustees' powers of disposition.50 On the strength of that analogy we feel it is correct to
apply the words of Cotton L.J. in Re Harwood to trustees' powers,51 which would provide the following
statement of the law: a power of disposition in a trust is nothing but an authority to defeat the
equitable interests of the beneficiaries, and when the trustees sell they transfer the legal estate not by
means of a power but by virtue of their legal ownership.
Before 1996 the dispositive powers of trustees of a statutory trust for sale had two sources. A trust for
sale imposed a duty upon the trustees to sell the land, which by necessary implication granted a
power to sell. Section 28(1) of the LPA conferred upon trustees for sale all the powers granted to a
tenant for life and the trustees of a settlement under the Settled Land Act 1925 (subsequently
abbreviated to SLA). Thus, in effect an extensive list of powers was incorporated into the LPA, but the
sum of those powers fell short of the powers of an absolute owner, so that the SLA powers delimited
the extent of the powers of trustees for sale. The limitation on the power to mortgage land subject to a
trust for sale was felt to be particularly onerous, and in practice the trustees' powers were often
expressly enlarged in a professionally drafted trust instrument.52 Thus, in express trusts for sale the
powers of the trustees had a third source, the provisions of the trust instrument. There is no reason to
differentiate between the implied power of sale, the powers granted by section 28 of the LPA, and any
express powers granted by the conveyance to the trustees.
Did section 28 grant the ability to act or the authority to act?
As legal owners of an estate in land trustees for sale have always had the power to make dispositions
of the legal estate, or of interests therein. Thus, when in case law a transaction was described as ultra
vires, in this context, it did not connote a lack of the ability to effect such a transaction, but a lack of
authority. An early explanation of this is contained in Lord Eldon's *L.Q.R. 278 judgment in the 1820
case of Bowes v. East London Water Works Company 53 :
“I take it the rule of law is, where a person has an interest [legal estate] and also an authority [power],
that a lease not made according to that authority [power], though not good under it [the power], will be
good, taking effect out of the interest [legal estate]; … The devise and the power taken together,
seem to amount to this, that though they [the trustees] were to have the whole interest [legal estate],
yet they were not to make leases … [of certain descriptions]”.54
The grant of a restricted “power” to lease was not truly the grant of the ability to act at all; as legal
owners the trustees could, and did, grant valid leases that exceeded the terms of the power. The
question was: “whether the leases they have made [which exceeded the terms of the power] by virtue
of that interest [legal estate] are to be considered, under all the circumstances, as abuses of their
trust”. In short, the view of Lord Eldon was that the lease took effect as a legal estate, because it was
derived out of the legal estate vested in the trustees, but its creation was a breach of trust because it
was not within the limited leasing power conferred on the trustees. Recognising this distinction, the
present authors dislike the use of the term ultra vires in this area. The expression encourages a
confounding of the two different meanings of the word “power”. One error that this confusion can lead
to, that a transaction that is outside the powers of a trustee is therefore void at law, was adverted to
by Lord Eldon55 : “The decree [of Sir Robert Gifford V.-C.] declares the leases to be void; by which I
presume, it is to be understood that they were void in equity56 ; for the lessors having the legal estate,
the power did not restrain their facility of dealing with it at law; but [it may be] … that they were not at
liberty to deal with it except in the manner prescribed [by the power].” It would be better to refer to
“unauthorised transactions” and avoid the confusion, but we are all constrained by past and current
usage.
A review of the law between 1820 and 1925 confirms the continuing validity of Lord Eldon's analysis.
Prior to the enactment of the 1925 Property Acts the position of a purchaser for value of a legal estate
buying from trustees, having established that legal title was vested in his vendors, depended upon
two factors: first, whether the sale was a due execution of the trust; if not, then second, whether the
Page4
purchaser had any notice of the existence of the trust, as notice of a trust would carry notice of the
terms *L.Q.R. 279 of the trust, and hence whether the conveyance to the purchaser was in breach of
trust. A sale made in due execution of the trust passed an unencumbered title to the purchaser
regardless of notice; this was known as overreaching. Thus, if the existence of a trust was apparent
from the abstract of title, or from other sources,57 a purchaser was obliged to investigate the terms of
the trust in order to ensure that it was properly executed by the sale. A power in the trustees to grant
a receipt absolving a purchaser from enquiry into the due execution of the trust did not necessarily
protect a purchaser.58 Any breach of trust, even a “technical” breach of trust,59 even a breach of trust
that was “the best [bargain] that could have been made under the circumstances” and wholly
beneficial to the beneficiaries,60 even a breach of trust made in accordance with the opinion of
counsel,61 rendered a purchaser potentially liable to the equitable interests of the beneficiaries.62 Thus
two fundamental principles can be identified: first, that the trustees as legal owners could dispose of
legal interests in the land; second, that any breach of trust rendered a purchaser liable to the
beneficiaries' interests, unless the purchaser was “equity's darling”.63 An ultra vires breach of trust
was simply one type of breach of trust, and carried no different consequences from any other type of
breach. The only difference between an ultra vires breach of trust and most intra vires breaches of
trust was that the ultra vires breach of trust prevented overreaching occurring even when both the
trustees and the purchaser were acting in good faith, a situation which could lead to unfair gains by
the beneficiaries at the purchaser's expense.64
There is nothing contained in the LPA to cast doubt upon the basic principle, that trustees can
dispose of their legal interests even when acting outside their authority, which derives of course from
the relationship between the courts of law and equity. Rather than interfere with the *L.Q.R. 280
effective disposition of legal estates and interests, the LPA facilitated such dispositions. The changes
introduced in 1925 were to the operation of the process known as overreaching, and to the operation
of the doctrine of notice. Therefore, the basic principle remained intact, and continues to do so unless
TLATA has made some change to it.
The nature of the powers of the tenant for life under the Settled Land Act 1925
The position of the tenant for life under a settlement governed by the SLA is anomalous. Even though
the legal fee simple is vested in the tenant for life by the SLA, any disposition not authorised by
statute or by the settlement is made “void” by section 18(1)(a), and section 18(1)(b) enacts that a
conveyance can “only take effect” if the provisions relating to payment of capital moneys are met.
This means that despite being the legal estate holder the tenant for life cannot dispose of a legal
interest in the land simply by dint of his legal estate, and that any ultra vires disposition will be
absolutely void. There is little doubt that this anomaly owes much to history, and little to principle.
Historically it was the SLA that first gave the legal fee simple to the tenant for life, and the best
explanation for the provisions of section 18 is that it anachronistically continues to treat the tenant for
life as a limited legal owner.65
The effect of section 18 of the SLA has been subject to criticism for many years, both because it is
contrary to principle to treat an estate owner as if he were the holder of a mere power, and because
the section has potentially mischievous effects. Harold Potter observed:
“The essential difficulty is derived from the fact that formerly there were limited estates with additional
powers. Now there is a theoretically unlimited estate, a fee simple, to which it is inappropriate at law
to attach powers either of enjoyment or disposition, but which in effect has been shorn of all its legal
‘rights’ of disposition and to which apparently there is an attempt to attach ‘powers’. This is a
confusion between the position of trustees who have unlimited rights of disposition which may be
affected by equitable limitations against a purchaser with notice and the old limited estates which at
law did not enable its owner to dispose at all of any less limited estate. Actually these notions are
quite inconsistent.”66
Potential dangers to purchasers, created by section 18 of the SLA, were identified by Mr Withers.67
The sanguine assumption of his critics,68 that *L.Q.R. 281 the judges would somehow construct a
solution from the provisions of the Act, was proved wrong by Weston v. Henshaw, 69 which illustrated
how section 18 could work injustice, even though the SLA scheme should have alerted the purchaser
to the danger.70
In short we should not expect to gain any guidance as to legal principle from the provisions of the SLA
in this respect. The position of the tenant for life as a legal owner that needs the grant of powers to
dispose of his estate is the exception that proves the rule. The legislation is anomalous, prone to
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produce injustice, and since 1996 a part of our law that has diminishing importance.71 There will
eventually come a time when the anomaly can be forgotten.72
The nature of the powers granted by section 18 of the Land Registration Act 1925
Prior to Harpum's article there was a feeling that the doctrine of conversion had some role to play
within the operation of overreaching.73 This approach continued to haunt discussion of overreaching
until the abolition of the doctrine of conversion by TLATA rendered it untenable.74 Unfortunately, the
very article that sounded the death knell of this error promulgated another misunderstanding that
threatens to become a new mistaken orthodoxy. In his seminal article Charles Harpum argued that
the powers of trustees for sale of registered land were granted by section 18 of the LRA. This
argument seems to have been accepted by the Court of Appeal in State *L.Q.R. 282 Bank of India v.
Sood. 75 In the most recent edition of Megarry and Wade, Law of Real Property, Harpum has dropped
the explicit argument that section 18 of the LRA governs the point,76 but the general approach
remains the same, and Sood is the key authority cited. Finally, in a recent note written by Martin
Dixon the possible role of section 18 as the grantor of powers to trustees is once more raised.77
Section 18 of the LRA grants to a registered proprietor of land those powers to deal with the land that
are the normal incidents of legal ownership of unregistered land. The grant is made to any registered
proprietor, and bestows the necessary power to deal with registered land on a single absolute owner
in exactly the same way as it grants powers of disposition to owners who happen to be trustees. The
ability to deal with registered land is conferred by statute,78 which also limits the modes of dealing with
registered land.79 When a restriction is placed on the register of title of a piece of land it prevents any
dealing with the legal estate in that land which does not comply with the terms of the restriction. This
is effected by the refusal of the Land Registrar to record a transaction which does not comply with a
relevant restriction.80 As dealings with the legal estate must be perfected by registration,81 any
disposition not falling within the terms of the restriction must have an effect in equity alone,82 or no
effect. The register records legal title,83 and not equitable title,84 and a purchaser must rely upon the
state of the register on a question of legal title.85 It is of course essential that the ability of a registered
proprietor to *L.Q.R. 283 deal with the legal title is respected if the system of registered title is to
function.86 There is no reason to suppose that any conflict existed between the operation of section 18
of the LRA and the operation of section 28 of the LPA.87 Upon the same reasoning, section 6 of
TLATA grants an authority to trustees of land to deal with the legal estate, an authority that presumes
the ability to so deal granted by section 18 of the LRA.88 There is no structural difference in this
respect between registered and unregistered land.
The leading authority in this area is City of London Building Society v. Flegg. 89 The speech of Lord
Oliver of Aylmerton was quite unambiguous on the source of the powers of trustees for sale of
registered land: “In the instant case the exercise by the registered proprietors of the powers conferred
on trustees for sale by section 28(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 had the effect of overreaching
the interests of the respondents under the statutory trusts”90 ; “The trustees' power to mortgage the
land was exercised when the charge was executed and the money was advanced and it was, under
section 28 of the Law of Property Act 1925, at this point that the interests of the appellants were
overreached”.91 As we have pointed out elsewhere, section 18 of the LRA was cited to the House in
argument, and was expressly referred to by Lord Templeman in his speech.92 There seems to be
neither room, nor cause, to suggest that the decision in Flegg was per incuriam, and as mentioned
above this is one particular in which we feel unable to follow Harpum's reasoning.
THE ROLE IN OVERREACHING OF SECTION 2 OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925
We have shown that the powers of trustees for sale under the old statutory regime acted as authority,
from which it follows that an ultra vires conveyance is a type of unauthorised conveyance. Harpum
showed that *L.Q.R. 284 under the old statutory regime an ultra vires conveyance by trustees for
sale of land did not result in an overreaching conveyance, because section 2 of the LPA operated
only if there had been a prior conveyance of a legal estate in land that was capable of overreaching
the equitable interests of the beneficiaries.93 An ultra vires conveyance was not capable of so
over-reaching, and a purchaser taking under an ultra vires conveyance was denied the assistance of
section 2. What we have yet to demonstrate is that the operation of section 2 was vital to the process
of overreaching under the old statutory regime. Whilst it is fairly easy to identify dicta that give
prominence to section 2 in the context of overreaching,94 none of these dicta give us much guidance
as to the function of section 2 in overreaching. Once the function of section 2 has been identified, we
can proceed to consider what limitations apply to its operation. We will then have a description of the
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role of the section within the process of overreaching of equitable interests in land.
One of Harpum's express aims in writing his article was to scotch an error he detected in the
reasoning of the Law Commission on the role of section 2 in overreaching.95 Harpum felt that section
2 was being seen as the source of overreaching and that this error was obstructing a true
understanding of the nature of overreaching, which rested on the powers of limited owners.96 In
practical terms this error led to the assertion that any conveyance of a legal estate to a purchaser
would overreach provided the requirements for the payment of capital money were met, and therefore
(by implication) that an ultra vires conveyance would have this effect. The success of Harpum in
reducing section 2 to a subsidiary role left the ambit of that role unclear. Given his starting point, no
concentrated attention was given to other provisions of the 1925 legislation that operated to protect
purchasers upon a conveyance, or transfer, of a legal estate in land.
An abundance of caution?
The opening words of section 2(1) of the LPA provide that: “A conveyance to a purchaser of a legal
estate in land shall overreach any equitable interest *L.Q.R. 285 or power affecting that estate,
whether or not he has notice thereof”.97 A conveyance must fall within one of the types of conveyance
listed in paragraphs (i)-(iv) of section 2(1); if such a conveyance falls within paragraphs (i)-(iii) it must
be “capable” of overreaching the equitable interest or power; capital money must be paid to the
appropriate person, or people. The section then exempts certain interests from its operation.98 We
have accepted that Harpum's article correctly identified the crucial importance of the expression
“capable of being overreached” in paragraphs (i)-(iii).99 The effect of these words is that only an intra
vires conveyance will activate section 2.
Harpum suggested that section 2 was “necessary to abrogate the principle that a purchaser, dealing
with a person whom he knew to be a trustee, had notice of the terms of the trust”.100 However, the
conveyances listed in section 2(1), paragraphs (i)-(iv), were all capable of overreaching equitable
interests despite notice thereof.101 If the opening words of section 2(1) were operative, they must have
protected purchasers from notice of something which could have prevented the conveyance from
having an overreaching effect. Mere notice of the trust would not prevent the overreaching effect of a
conveyance; “statements commonly found in textbooks, to the effect that a purchaser of property
having notice of equitable interests affecting it is bound by them, are misleading unless they except a
purchaser who acquires the property from a legal owner duly exercising an authority to overreach the
equitable interests in question”.102
A possible construction of the opening words of section 2 is that they were enacted out of an
abundance of caution, and that they give no substantive protection to purchasers of legal estates in
land. The legislation of 1925 formed a connected scheme, and in construing section 2 we have to
take into account other provisions in the Acts that provide protection to purchasers from taking subject
to equitable interests.103 Some of these *L.Q.R. 286 provisions restrict the protection they offer, either
by requiring some quality in the purchaser, or by denying protection in certain circumstances. Thus
good faith is required of purchasers by section 110 of the SLA104 ; protection is denied to a purchaser
acting in collusion by section 13(2) of the Trustee Act 1925105 ; only in the absence of facts revealed
by the investigation of title to the contrary can a purchaser rely upon the presumption that an assent
or conveyance made by a personal representative was properly made to the person entitled to the
legal estate under the provisions of section 36(7) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925106 ; and
section 29(1) of the LPA only operated “unless the contrary appears”.107 A common provision, the
effect of which is less than clear, is that “a purchaser shall not be concerned to see …” whether there
is some particular type of defect in the equitable title to the land.108 Section 26 of the LPA deemed
consents sufficient,109 or not required.110
The profusion of specific provisions protective of purchasers allows the possibility that the opening
words of section 2(1) were enacted out of an abundance of caution, and had no effect.111 The
legislation could have been intended to meet every possible risk to a purchaser by an express
provision acting like a statutory sticking plaster, protecting purchasers from each and every
conceivable risk. The primary purpose of section 2(1) could have been to protect holders of equitable
interests, preventing their interests from being overreached when capital money was paid to a single
trustee, *L.Q.R. 287 not being a trust corporation. A consideration of the rest of the section suggests
such a construction is wrong. The section referred to the “protection afforded by this section to the
purchaser of a legal estate”,112 and showed an anxiety that the protection given by subsection 2(1)
could be construed as extending the overreaching effects of a conveyance further than was intended,
rather than that it had no effect.113
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It seems then that there is no immediately obvious role for the opening words of section 2 within the
statutory scheme laid down in 1925, yet general principles of statutory construction, judicial dicta, and
the provisions of the section suggest that the words were intended to have some definite effect. If we
can identify some risk that was not specifically provided against elsewhere, then we can assess the
suitability of section 2 for meeting that risk to purchasers.
Intra vires but wrong?
If we accept that section 2 was ill suited to protecting against an ultra vires breach of trust, then
perhaps we should consider the possibility that the section was designed to protect a purchaser from
the effects of an intra vires breach of trust. As today, before 1926 a trustee was bound to exercise any
power vested in him as trustee “in a reasonable and proper manner”114 ; failure to do so was a breach
of trust. If a purchaser had notice of this breach of trust then he took subject to the beneficiaries'
interest.115 The various ways in which trustees can commit a breach of trust are limited only by the
bounds of human ingenuity and incompetence. The technique we have likened to applying sticking
plasters would lead to an absurd proliferation of such “plasters” if each and every conceivable breach
of trust was met by a specific statutory provision. For every power capable of being exercised by
trustees it would be necessary to provide how a misuse of that power would, or would not, affect a
purchaser. A constant review of the resulting patchwork of plasters would then be needed, to ensure
it was *L.Q.R. 288 not inadequate owing to the discovery of new forms of breach of trust unforeseen
in 1925. Purchasers needed protection from the application of a general principle of the law, and this
would be best effected by a general exclusion of that principle. The risk that followed a breach of duty
by trustees was transmitted to purchasers via the doctrine of notice, and section 2(1) operated to
prevent any type of notice from affecting purchasers. Section 2(1) seems well suited to the task of
giving purchasers immunity from the risks that formerly followed upon trustees' failure to satisfy the
standards of probity and care demanded by equity.
The risk posed to purchasers by trustees effecting a disposition which exceeded their powers was to
be met by the provision of generous statutory powers of disposition. This left the risk posed by
trustees misusing those powers unaffected. The case law provided sufficient examples of purchasers
being affected by trustees' misfeasance to show that the risk was not insignificant. Thus, trustees
dealt with the trust property as if it belonged to them absolutely, either with fraudulent intent,116 or
innocently117 ; trustees failed to exercise such care and judgment as equity required when using their
powers118 ; equitable mortgagors, who were treated as trustees, deliberately concealed equitable
interests to borrow twice on the same security, which had the incidental effect of destroying the first
lender's security.119 If we broaden our review to take in those cases that were classified as equitable
frauds on a power, we discover a rich diversity of inappropriate behaviour120 : trustees used their
powers of appointment to try and bring about the breakdown of a beneficiary's marriage121 ; tenants
for life used their statutory powers to grant leases and easements designed to intimidate
remaindermen into compliance with their wishes122 ; tenants for life used their powers in high-minded
but inappropriate ways, to encourage public sobriety123 ; and in low-minded and inappropriate ways,
to obtain a bribe,124 to secure a benefit after the tenant *L.Q.R. 289 for life's interest had determined,
125 or to spite the remaindermen.126 Such abuses could affect purchasers, and the protection offered
to purchasers by the doctrine of notice was limited by judicial willingness to hold that purchasers were
put on inquiry, and that failure to inquire was notice of whatever might have been discovered.127 The
examples given above were all part of the common learning of conveyancers in 1925, and there is
every reason to suppose that the 1925 legislation was intended to make provision for the risks posed
to purchasers by such breaches of trust. Such a role for section 2 avoids the error identified by
Harpum, of viewing the section as a panacea, yet leaves the section an important role consonant with
the judicial view that it is an essential part of the overreaching machinery introduced by the 1925
legislation.
Let us apply this analysis to the question of the validity of the decision in Hodgson v. Marks. 128 Mrs
Hodgson had transferred the legal title to her home to Mr Evans under such circumstances that a
resulting trust arose in her favour. Mr Evans was a bare trustee for Mrs Hodgson, but he transferred
the property to a purchaser for value, Mr Marks, without the knowledge or authority of Mrs Hodgson.
Mrs Hodgson had been in actual occupation of the house at the time of the transfer, and therefore her
interests were overriding under section 70(1)(g) of the LRA. The Court of Appeal held that Mr Marks
took the land subject to Mrs Hodgson's interest. Harpum suggested that section 18 of the LRA
operated to grant Mr Evans, as bare trustee, powers of disposition, and the transfer to Mr Marks was
therefore intra vires. Further, section 14 of the Trustee Act 1925 gave Mr Evans, as a trustee, the
power to give a valid receipt for the purchase price.129 Therefore, the sale was capable of
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overreaching the equitable interest of Mrs Hodgson independently of section 2 of the LPA and the
Court of Appeal had been wrong to hold Mr Marks bound by her interest.
We have already explained why we reject this construction of section 18 of the LRA. However, if we
accept that Mr Evans had a power of sale, granted by section 1 of the Trustee Investments Act 1961,
and the power to give a discharging receipt, granted by section 14 of the Trustee Act 1925, then the
Court of Appeal would still have been right to conclude that the *L.Q.R. 290 conveyance by Mr Evans
had not overreached the equitable interest of Mrs Hodgson. Quite clearly the transfer to Mr Evans
was in breach of trust, and a purchaser takes subject to the equitable interests of beneficiaries if they
have notice that their title was transferred to them in breach of trust. In registered land the relevant
concept is not notice, but occupation. As section 2 of the LPA did not operate, since there was no
trust for sale, and capital money had been paid to a single trustee, Mr Marks took subject to Mrs
Hodgson's equitable interest in the land. Harpum's argument suffers from making the incorrect
assumption that because an intra vires conveyance can overreach then it will overreach. This is not
the case, unless section 2 of the LPA is operating to shield purchasers from being affected by notice
of impropriety on the part of the trustees.
Limitations on the operation of section 2
We have identified a role for section 2 of the LPA. The section operated whenever there was a sale
by trustees for sale, but not upon a sale by trustees with a mere power of sale.130 It now falls to
consider what, if any, limitations applied to the operation of the section.
The disposition had to be intra vires
We take it as established that only an intra vires conveyance by trustees for sale could activate
section 2 of the LPA. If correct then this analysis should be applicable to the other paragraphs of
section 2(1). Paragraphs (i) and (iv) do not raise any problems.131 Paragraph (iii) deals with a
conveyance “by a mortgagee or personal representative in the exercise of his paramount powers”.
The word “exercise” is noteworthy in this context. The law regarding the use of a mortgagee's power
of sale distinguishes between the power “arising” and the power becoming “exercisable”.132 As a
matter *L.Q.R. 291 of language one cannot exercise that which is not yet exercisable. We should
therefore find some provision other than section 2 of the LPA operating to protect purchasers who
take under a conveyance made when the mortgagees' power of sale has arisen but is not yet
exercisable, as section 2 cannot operate on such an occasion. The matter is provided for by section
104(2)(a) and (b) of the LPA.133 Section 104(2) operates in two distinct ways: it declares that “a
purchaser's title will not be impeachable” on listed grounds, and it restricts the operation of the
doctrine of notice. It seems fairly clear that, without section 104(2)(a) and (b), the general law would
view a purported exercise of a power of sale that had not become exercisable as void in equity.134
This may explain the exceptional resort to a mechanism of protection that is not reliant upon the
doctrine of notice,135 but which makes a purchaser's title unimpeachable. In so providing, the section
effectively empowers the mortgagee to convey free of the mortgagor's equity of redemption when the
power to do so under section 101 of the LPA is not exercisable.
The statutory requirements respecting the payment of capital money (when a
conveyance was made by trustees for sale) had to be complied with
These statutory requirements were contained in section 27 of the LPA, and therefore it was common
form to refer to the operation of section 2 and section 27 of the LPA.136 It was in part to dispel the fog
that surrounded this linked pair of sections that Harpum wrote. The requirement that “the proceeds of
sale or other capital money shall not be paid to or applied by the direction of fewer than two persons
as trustees for sale, except where *L.Q.R. 292 the trustee is a trust corporation” was laid down in
section 27(2). The requirement could not be ousted by any contrary intention expressed in any
document that created the trust for sale. A purchaser was concerned to ensure that the subsection
was complied with, in order to obtain a good receipt for his purchase money, and to ensure that
section 2 operated. Section 27(1) is a quite separate provision, which frees purchasers from the need
to inquire into either the administration of the trust for sale prior to the sale, or into the disposition of
the proceeds of sale in the trustees' hands.137
An analysis of overreaching that gave a role to the doctrine of conversion gave unwarranted
prominence to section 27(1) of the LPA. Nevertheless, that was formerly the predominant judicial
approach. It was held that the interests of beneficiaries were “interests in personalty”, they were not
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“owners of equitable interests in realty”, and
“the whole purpose of the trust for sale is to make sure by shifting the equitable interests away from
the land and into the proceeds of sale, that a purchaser of the land takes free from the equitable
interests. To hold these to be equitable interests in the land itself would be to frustrate this purpose.
Even to hold that they have equitable interests in the land for a limited period, namely, until the land is
sold, would, we think, be inconsistent with the trust for sale being an ‘immediate’ trust for sale working
an immediate conversion.”138
If this dictum was correct then section 2 of the LPA had no clearly discernible role to play, and the
only interests in any property under a trust for sale were in the rents and profits before the sale, and in
the proceeds of the sale after sale. It is the trust of the rents and profits and proceeds that is the
concern of section 27(1), and therefore the section is likely to be viewed as the more important of the
two sections when considering the pairing of section 2 and section 27 of the LPA.
In truth, section 27 was merely one of the statutory sticking plasters, dealing with one type of breach
of trust, the misapplication of purchase money.139 Such a provision was never capable of freeing land
from an equitable interest. If the only breach of trust were a subsequent misapplication of the
purchase money, then a purchaser could rely upon section 27, and the breach would not invalidate an
otherwise overreaching conveyance. The section had no effect on any other breach of trust which
might prevent overreaching from taking place, if the purchaser had notice of that *L.Q.R. 293 breach.
It was section 2 of the LPA that had the effect of allowing an equitable interest to be shifted from land
following a conveyance of a legal estate in breach of trust.
In this regard the decision of the Court of Appeal in State Bank of India v. Sood should mark the end
of any misapprehension.140 As, on the assumed facts, there was no capital money paid at the time of
the grant of the mortgage, the receipt element of section 27 of the LPA could have no application. It
was argued that the payment of some capital money to at least two trustees was an essential element
in any overreaching conveyance.141 This argument was rightly rejected by the court142 : “The statutory
requirements governing capital money … can only apply to those conveyances giving rise to capital
money”. If the statutory requirements for the payment of capital money to two trustees do not always
need to be complied with, then they cannot form the basis for overreaching; rather they are a
limitation on the process of overreaching, which process has its source in the dispositive powers of
trustees.
Section 2 gave way where a particular type of breach of trust was addressed by
another specific statutory provision
Any consideration of the effects of section 2 of the LPA seems absent from the case law concerning
the use of a mortgagee's power of sale. Some cases are explicable on the grounds that section 2(1)
could not have operated, i.e. when the power of sale had not arisen, or was not exercisable, but there
are other cases, in which there was no issue as to the power having both arisen and become
exercisable. The law is usually taken from Lord Waring v. London and Manchester Assurance Co., in
which Crossman J. said: “Of course, if the purchaser becomes aware, during that period, of any facts
showing that the power of sale is not exercisable, or that there is some impropriety in the sale, then,
in my judgment, he gets no good title on taking the conveyance.”143 If section 2(1) of the LPA applied
to the exercise of the mortgagee's power of sale (as one might anticipate from section 2(1)(iii)), then
this dictum would seem extremely heterodox, given that the word “purchaser” was defined as not
requiring good faith in section 2.144 No doubt the reason is that section 104(2) of the LPA has such a
wide-ranging effect. As we have shown above, the section protects a *L.Q.R. 294 purchaser from
being adversely affected by the use of a power of sale which has arisen but which is not exercisable,
and, therefore, it operates when section 2 could not aid a purchaser. But, section 104(2)(d) also
provides protection to a purchaser when: “… the power [of sale conferred by section 101 of the Law
of Property Act 1925] was otherwise [i.e. in some way not provided for by paragraphs (a) to (c) of the
section] improperly or irregularly exercised”. Section 2 has no application in this area of law because
a specific provision covers the entire field of its potential operation, and it is the weaker protection
granted by section 104(2) that is available to purchasers from a mortgagee conveying a legal estate
in pursuance of its power of sale.145
This construction of the relationship between sections 2(1) and 104(2) of the LPA has three
interesting effects. First, it keeps the operation of the rather draconian provisions of section 2 within
reasonable bounds. Second, it means that when construing provisions that offer protection to
purchasers other than section 2 (those provisions we have elsewhere referred to as “statutory sticking
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plasters”), such provisions may properly be regarded as providing a limited protection to purchasers if
in the absence of any of those provisions section 2 would apply. Third, it allows for the possibility that
the removal of a provision protective of purchasers might have the effect of extending the operation of
section 2, and thereby counter-intuitively extending the protection of purchasers.146
CONCLUSION
Overreaching is the corollary of the grant to a limited owner of powers of disposition. If the due
exercise of such powers did not overreach then the grant of the powers would be illusory, and the
limited owner armed with those powers would be forced to obtain the endorsement of the grantor to
any disposition. The utility for property owners, and for purchasers, of the possibility of overreaching
is therefore obvious. However, problems arise when limited owners exceed or misuse their powers of
disposition; conflicting claims then arise. Purchasers will be threatened by a rigid insistence that only
a due exercise of the powers will be effective, but, on the other hand, an overly liberal willingness to
condone defects in the exercise of the powers will threaten the owners of interests in the property.
The essential difficulty is a classic problem of property law: the balancing of conflicting claims to the
same property.
*L.Q.R. 295 Our analysis has concentrated on the operation of overreaching in the context of
transactions that are intimately familiar on a practical level in our time: sales and mortgages effected
by trustees holding land for the benefit of co-owners, and the exercise by a mortgagee of the statutory
power of sale. We have found that the existing literature, even Harpum, did not provide a completely
satisfactory analysis. The effects of a sale or other disposition by two trustees, and a sale by a
mortgagee exercising the statutory power of sale, are, of course, well established, and most
treatments of the subject have contented themselves with establishing what happens, without delving
into the question of why (or precisely how).
We have sought to fill the gap. We submit that, of the difficulties posed to any analysis into the
principles that underlie overreaching, the ambiguity contained in the word “power” deserves principal
mention. This is apparent from our analysis of the nature of a mortgagee's statutory power of sale;
this constitutes both the grant of an ability and an authority, but the relationship between this point
and the distinction between the power arising and becoming exercisable, has not always been
apparent in the literature.147 The operation of section 104(2) of the LPA, in both allowing overreaching
to occur, and shielding purchasers from the consequences of an improper exercise of the power, has
not previously been the subject of precise analysis. Similarly, the central importance of section 2 of
the LPA has not been in doubt since Harpum wrote, but there has been no clear analysis of its
function and operation. We hope that this article, complementing Harpum's, will provide the
much-needed basis of principle for future analyses of the law of overreaching.
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